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ABSTRACT
Hidden Markov Model-based Clustering for Malware Classification
by Shamli Singh
Automated techniques to classify malware samples into their respective families
are critical in cybersecurity. Previously research applied 𝑘-means clustering to scores
generated by hidden Markov models (HMM) as a means of dealing with the malware
classification problem. In this research, we follow a somewhat similar approach, but
instead of using HMMs to generate scores, we directly cluster the HMMs themselves.
We obtain good results on a challenging malware dataset.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware, or malicious software, is a prominent antagonist in the digital era. We
rely heavily on software for various aspects of civilization, from national security to
trading, science research, or just entertainment. Analogously, malware plays a leading
role in computer crime and information warfare, including malicious access of resources,
stealing sensitive data, or simply spreading corrupt files through various computers.
In recent years, smartphones are taking over desktop and laptop computers as the
preferred device for consumers. Their popularity and constant internet connectivity
mean an increase in the number of devices susceptible to malware attacks. According
to [1], malware is spread rapidly, and it continuously evolves to escape malware
detection tools. Usually, malware detection tools depend on malware signatures.
However, this can be slow, and new malware variants cannot be detected.
Malware can appear in various forms, including viruses, spyware, and worms [2, 3].
Malware is a critically important research topic in cybersecurity. Many malware
detection techniques are available, and we elaborate on some of these in Chapter 2.
Malware attacks come with a lot of costs, both visible and hidden. The visible
costs include the time and money required to deal with malware detection and clean up
infected systems. It also includes the loss of productivity in the affected organization.
The damage to the organization’s reputation represents the hidden costs, as observed
in [2].
There is still a lack of robust strategies to detect or classify malware. Malware
classification is an essential aspect of protecting computer systems. If we can determine
the family that a new malware belongs to, we can save time finding the correct strategy
to nullify it by using known techniques. On the other hand, if detected malware does
not fit the existing types, then we need to find new approaches.
1

In this paper, we focus on automated malware classification using hidden Markov
models (HMMs) and clustering techniques. Specifically, we train HMMs on malware
opcodes representing various families and then perform clustering on these models to
classify them into their respective families. This work can be viewed as an extension
of the previous research in [4].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 includes relevant
background information on malware detection strategies, and also discusses HMM
and clustering in detail. Chapter 3 gives an overview of related previous work on
malware classification. Chapter 4 covers the implementation of clustering algorithms
used for malware classification in this research, as well as our experiments and results.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with suggested future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
2.1

Malware
Our computer infrastructure is at constant war with various forms of threats like

bugs, spam, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and malware [2]. As discussed in Chapter
1, malware dominates all security threats. The purpose of writing malware can be
simply a prank or as threatening as organized crimes or warfare or espionage. Figure
1 shows the rapid increase in the volume of malware attacks for the past decade.

Figure 1: Total Malware Infection Growth Rate [5]
Malware covers a broad spectrum of threats like viruses, worms, and spyware. We
give a brief overview of some of them before moving to malware detection techniques.
2.1.1

Virus

A virus is the most commonly heard type of malware. True to its name, this
malware replicates itself by infecting executable programs. The infected programs
further propagate the virus during their execution. It can also live in the computer
memory and propagates through external devices or software, or emails. Like a
biological virus, it may also exhibit metamorphism – it can change its form while
infecting more programs [3]. Malware writers explicitly use this feature to evade
malware detection tools.

3

2.1.2

Trojan Horse

Like the historic plot by Greek invaders to capture Troy, a Trojan Horse is a
program devised to look harmless by performing a benign task and secretly perform
a malicious task. Password and form grabbers fall under this category, as described
by [2]. According to [6], they can also control a user’s system or disable the firewall.
They are also capable of downloading other malware to the system. Zeus or Zbot is a
famous trojan family, and it was widely used for crimes like bank frauds and money
laundering in the last two decades [7].
2.1.3

Backdoor

A backdoor, also known as a trapdoor, is built to circumvent a standard security
check [2]. Programmers may create backdoors for legitimate reasons when their code
is in the development phase. Still, cybercriminals exploit this vulnerability for tasks
like deleting files, accessing sensitive data, installing additional malware, and opening
communication ports for remote access of the system [8].
2.1.4

Spyware and Adware

Spyware is a program that installs itself on a computer system along with some
benign software and spy on user activities, including internet usage history, keystrokes,
forms, and also read files covertly and install additional malware [9]. Adware is
slightly different from spyware. Adware looks like a regular program but instead
pops up errors or updates and then asks the user to pay money to continue working.
Winwebsec is a famous family of adware [10].
2.2

Malware Detection Techniques
Malware writers constantly improve their malware by making it undetectable

for signature-based antivirus tools. Similarly, security software companies continue
their research on ways to improve their malware detection techniques. The following
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sections describe the strategies used in building these techniques.
2.2.1

Signature Based Detection

Signature-based detection is the prevalent technique deployed by many antivirus
software due to its accuracy, speed, and simplicity [3]. The software scans each
executable for malware signature or pattern, which is generally a string of bits and
kept in the antivirus database. Despite being popular, the downside to this approach is
that antivirus software can detect only known malware based on its updated database.
Malicious users generally evade these tools by obfuscating the malware code.
2.2.2

Anomaly Based Detection

Anomaly detection is designed to find unusual and potentially malicious activity.
It is a heuristic approach to training the system with normal behavior [11]. The
system can then flag anything outside the expected behavior. While this technique
can help detect previously unknown malware, it is not yet proven robust enough as a
standalone technique and involves false positives [3].
2.2.3

Machine Learning Based Detection

Anomaly-based detection above can be categorized as a machine learning technique
and a behavioral technique. But pure machine learning techniques are also adopted
for malware detection and classification. Researchers in [12] tested this approach by
computing behavior scores in a sandbox and using them to generate sparse vector
models. They used these models with various machine learning techniques like Support
Vector Machine (SVM), naïve Bayes, decision trees, random forest, and multilayer
perceptron (MLP). Another research suggested using AutoEncoder, a deep learning
technique for malware detection [13].

5

2.2.4

Hidden Markov Model Based Detection

Hidden Markov models (HMMs) are used for statistical pattern analysis, broadly
in speech recognition, biological sequence analysis, and malware detection [14]. The
general approach tests the malware dataset against trained HMMs and computes
scores for each file in the dataset. The malware and benign scores will not overlap for
a range of values known as a threshold [15]. This threshold is then used to distinguish
benign files from malignant files.
2.3

Hidden Markov Models
A statistical model with states and known probabilities of the state transitions is

called a Markov model [15]. The states are visible to an observer in such a model. On
the contrary, a hidden Markov model has states that are not directly observable [14].
HMM acts as a state machine, where each state is associated with a probability
distribution for observing a state of observation symbols. We can train an HMM
using the observation sequences that represent some data.
2.3.1

Notation

As given in [15], we use the notation given in Table 1 to define an HMM.
Table 1: HMM Notation
𝑇 = length of observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of distinct observation symbols
𝑄 = distinct states in the model
𝑉 = set of possible observations
𝐴 = state transition probability matrix
𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝒪 = observation sequence
An HMM is defined by the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrices, and is denoted as 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋).
Figure 2 shows a generic HMM representation.
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Figure 2: A Hidden Markov Model [16]
2.3.2

The Three Problems

Three fundamental problems can be solved using an HMM. They are described
below.
2.3.2.1

Problem 1

Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, we need to find
𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆). This means we want to compute a score for an observed sequence 𝒪 with
respect to a model 𝜆 [15].
2.3.2.2

Problem 2

Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, we want to reveal
the hidden part of the model [15].
2.3.2.3

Problem 3

Given an observation sequence 𝒪 and the number of states 𝑁 , we need to
determine the model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) that maximizes the probability of 𝒪. This also
implies we train a model to fit the observed data, using a hill-climb approach [15].
In this project, we are using the algorithm for Problem 3. We are using an
observation sequence 𝒪 with some number of states 𝑁 and generating the models
𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) for each malware opcode sequence file.
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2.3.3

The Solutions

The problems are solved using the following algorithms:
2.3.3.1

The Forward Algorithm

Also known as the 𝛼 pass, the forward algorithm is used to determine 𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆),
as in problem 1. It is given as follows. For 𝑡 = 0, 1, ..., 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1,
define
𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪0 , 𝒪1 , . . . , 𝒪𝑡 , 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑞𝑡 |𝜆)
where 𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) is the probability of partial observation sequence up to time 𝑡.
Thus, 𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆) can be computed as follows.
1. Let 𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑡 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪0 ), for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1
2. For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, compute
⎛

𝑁
−1
∑︁

𝛼𝑡 (𝑖) = ⎝

⎞

𝛼𝑡−1 (𝑗)𝑎𝑖𝑗 ⎠ 𝑏𝑖 (𝒪𝑡 )

𝑗=1

2.3.3.2

The Backward Algorithm

Also known as the 𝛽 pass, the backward algorithm is used to find a most likely
optimal state sequence, like in problem 2. It is given as follows: For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1
and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, define
𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪𝑡+1 , 𝒪𝑡+2 , . . . , 𝒪𝑇 −1 , 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑞𝑡 |𝜆)
Thus, 𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) can be computed as follows.
1. Let 𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) = 1, for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1
2. For 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 2, 𝑇 − 3, . . . , 0 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, compute
𝛽𝑡 (𝑖) =

𝑁
−1
∑︁

𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗 (𝒪𝑡+1 )𝛽𝑡+1 (𝑗)

𝑗=0
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For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 2 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, define
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖 |𝒪, 𝜆)
The relevant probability up to time 𝑡 is given by
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) =
2.3.3.3

𝛼𝑡 (𝑖)𝛽𝑡 (𝑖)
𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆)

The Baum-Welch Re-estimation Algorithm

The Baum-Welch algorithm helps to re-estimate the 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrices iteratively [15]. This helps efficiently fit a model to observations, according to problem 3.
The parameters 𝑁 and 𝑀 remain constant throughout the process, whereas the 𝐴, 𝐵
and 𝜋 matrices can change with the row-stochastic condition in place. The process is
as follows.
1. Initialize 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) with random values. Generally these are set as 𝜋 = 1/𝑁 ,
𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑁 and 𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑀 .
2. Compute 𝛼𝑡 (𝑖), 𝛽𝑡 (𝑖), 𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) and 𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) where 𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗) is a di-gamma. It is defined
as
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) =

𝛼𝑡 (𝑖)𝑎𝑖𝑗 𝑏𝑗 (𝒪𝑡+1 )𝛽𝑡+1 (𝑗)
𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆)

where
𝛾𝑡 (𝑖) =

𝑁
−1
∑︁

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)

𝑗=0

3. Re-estimate model parameters For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, let
𝜋𝑖 = 𝛾0 (𝑖)
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, compute
𝑇∑︁
−2

𝑎𝑖𝑗 =

𝛾𝑡 (𝑖, 𝑗)

𝑡=0
𝑇∑︁
−2
𝑡=0
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𝛾𝑡 (𝑖)

For 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑘 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑀 − 1, compute
∑︁

𝑏𝑖𝑗 =

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗)

𝑡∈{0,1...,𝑇 −1}
𝒪𝑡 =𝑘

𝑇∑︁
−2

𝛾𝑡 (𝑗)

𝑡=0

4. If 𝑃 (𝒪 | 𝜆) increases, go back to step 3.
2.4

Clustering
Clustering is the process of categorizing objects into subsets based on some form

of similarity index [17]. It is an unsupervised machine learning approach. Following
are the most popular approaches to clustering objects.
• Hierarchical Clustering: The data is broken into a hierarchy of clusters.
Each object is a separate cluster at the start. Then the algorithm computes
a dendrogram by merging smaller clusters into larger ones (agglomerative approach) or dividing larger clusters into smaller ones (divisive approach) [18, 19].
The number of clusters is not predetermined, and the process only requires the
similarity measure as an input.
• Partitional Clustering: Partitional clustering starts by first generating partitions using randomness or some policy and then evaluate them based on a
criterion [17]. Each object is placed in one of 𝑘 mutually exclusive divisions.
Then the partition boundaries and centroids of the partitions change according
to some algorithm [18]. 𝐾-means is one of the most popular partitional clustering algorithms, where the number of partitions 𝑘 is predetermined. While this
method is faster than hierarchical clustering, the output depends heavily on the
choice of the number 𝑘.
2.4.1

𝐾-means Clustering Algorithm

𝐾-means is the most straightforward unsupervised learning algorithm used to
solve classification problems using clustering [16]. It classifies data into a predetermined
10

number of clusters, called 𝑘. Cluster centroids are defined for each cluster, and each
data point (or object) is associated with the centroid nearest to it [17]. The centroids
may or may not be from within the dataset. Euclidean distance method is used. In the
next step, the centroids are calculated again to account for the data points assigned
to them. These steps keep repeating until there is no change to the centroid [17].
The Euclidean distance between two points 𝑥 = (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , . . . , 𝑥𝑛 ) and 𝑦 =
(𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , 𝑦3 , . . . , 𝑦𝑛 ) is given by
𝑑(𝑥, 𝑦) =
2.4.2

√︁

(𝑥1 − 𝑦1 )2 + (𝑥2 − 𝑦2 )2 + (𝑥3 − 𝑦3 )2 + · · · + (𝑥𝑛 − 𝑦𝑛 )2

𝐾-medoids Clustering Algorithm

𝐾−medoids is a relatively popular method of clustering that searches for 𝑘 objects
called medoids. The medoids are considered representatives of the dataset as they
are chosen from within the dataset. Like 𝑘-means, this algorithm minimizes the
average dissimilarity of all data objects with the centroids, also known as medoids [20].
We can tune the algorithm to work with different types of similarity metrics like
Euclidean distance, Minkowski distance, or cosine similarity, making it robust to noise
and outliers. We can also feed just the set of dissimilarities instead of actual data
objects to this algorithm. One way to do this is a distance correlation matrix, which
is discussed in detail in 4. The algorithm itself is based on the Partitioning Around
Medoids (PAM) program, as developed by the authors in [20].
2.4.3

Cluster Quality

An ideal cluster has minimal intra-cluster distance and maximum inter-cluster
distance [16]. Following two methods are the standards used for internal and external
validation of any clustering algorithm.
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2.4.3.1

Elbow Method

The elbow method is a simple but not robust method of estimating the optimal
number of 𝑘. The technique involves running the algorithm multiple times with
an increasing number of clusters and plotting the clustering score (also known as
distortion) against the number of clusters. The distortion is typically is the error
sum of squares (SSE) [21]. As the number of clusters 𝑘 increases, the SSE decreases.
Sometimes we may not have clearly clustered data, so the elbow may not be sharp
and clear.
2.4.3.2

Silhouette Analysis

The silhouette value is a measure of similarity of a data point to its own cluster
compared to other clusters [21]. It ranges from -1 to 1, and a higher value indicates
ideal clustering.
Silhouette value 𝑠(𝑖) for each point 𝑖 is given as:
𝑠(𝑖) =

𝑏(𝑖) − 𝑎(𝑖)
(︁

)︁

max 𝑎(𝑖), 𝑏(𝑖)

Here 𝑎(𝑖) is the measure of similarity of point 𝑖 to its own cluster, also called
cohesion. Similarly, 𝑏(𝑖) is the dissimilarity of point 𝑖 from points in other clusters,
also called as separation.
For each point 𝑖 in the cluster 𝐶𝑖 ,
𝑎(𝑖) =

∑︁
1
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)
|𝐶𝑖 | − 1 𝑗𝜖𝐶𝑖 ,𝑖̸=𝑗

and
𝑏(𝑖) = min
𝑘̸=𝑖

1 ∑︁
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)
|𝐶𝑘 | 𝑗𝜖𝐶𝑘

where 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) is the Euclidean distance between points 𝑖 and 𝑗.
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CHAPTER 3
Related Work
There has been much research in the domain of malware detection and classification already. This chapter will discuss some of the previous attempts at malware
classification, and we can broadly categorize them as machine learning-based and
characteristics-based.
3.1

Classification using Structure and Behavior of Malware
The earliest malware detection strategies have relied on the visible characteristics

of malware, like their structure or behavior. These characteristics are usually dependent
on how well the malware code is written and whether code obfuscation has been used.
The strategies are further discussed in detail below.
3.1.1

Structure Control Flow

A control flow graph is the representation of the execution path a program might
take. The research demonstrated in [22] successfully classified malware by using
approximate matching of control flow graphs. They first analyze the entropy of
malware binary to check if it has undergone code packing transformation. If packed,
application-level emulation reveals hidden code on unpacking. String analysis then
builds signatures for the control flow graphs. These signatures are compared with
the existing malware database using string edit distances. A similarity between flow
graphs is obtained and categorized accordingly based on a threshold value. The
research has also worked successfully on variants of known malware.
3.1.2

Behavioral Malware Classification

To build more potent malware, malicious users sometimes make variants of
existing malware using code obfuscation, thus confusing antivirus tools that depend on
malware signatures. Even though malware variants of the same family have different
signatures, they have common characteristic behavioral patterns due to their shared
13

heritage and function, as suspected by the authors of [23]. They built an automatic
classification system trained on observed similarities in behavioral features extracted
from malware variants in a family and then used decision trees to classify the malware.
3.2

Malware Classification using Machine Learning techniques
There have been various advances in the machine learning field, and malware

detection and classification have not been held back in these advances. In [16], the
author has demonstrated several applications of different machine learning techniques
to real-world problems like malware detection and classification.
3.2.1

Support Vector Machines (SVM)

Support Vector Machines [16] are supervised machine learning models used for
classification that can analyze and recognize patterns. SVMs use kernel function
to map training data into a high-dimensional space and makes the problem linearly
separable. After training, the model can classify new data into one of the categories.
The research combines each malware scoring technique with SVM: HMMs, simple
substitution distance (SSD), and opcode graph similarity (OGS) [24]. SVM was
applied on scores obtained from each of these methods. They found the results to be
more robust than using the individual techniques.
3.2.2

Naïve Bayes

Naïve Bayes classifier is a probabilistic method that has been used for a long
time in various information retrieval and text classification systems [25]. The classifier
stores the prior probability of each class of malware, 𝑃 (𝐶𝑖 ), and the conditional
probability of each attribute value given a class, 𝑃 (𝑣𝑖 |𝐶𝑖 ) [16]. These probabilities
are determined by training the classifier on the dataset. Then Bayes rule is used to
compute the posterior probability of each class given an unknown instance and return
its predicted class of malware.
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3.2.3

Random Forest

A random forest is a machine learning method used for classification and regression.
It is an ensemble of decision trees, where each tree determines the class label of an
unlabeled instance [11]. Each tree is divided at each node, taking into account random
features. In the end, the model selects the most chosen class amongst all trees. More
number of trees can mean better accuracy, but random forest also tends to overfit on
data [16].
3.2.4

Nearest Neighbor using VILO

In [26], researchers talk about VILO, a rapid-learning nearest neighbor algorithm
for familial malware classification problem. VILO is a three-fold technique. First,
𝑁 -perm is a robust version of 𝑛-gram of size 𝑛 over malware opcodes. TF-IDF or
term frequency and inverse document frequency is the vectorization method used to
weigh malware features. TF-IDF makes the technique efficient for variants of known
malware. Finally, the nearest neighbor algorithm is used on these feature vectors and
feature weights to classify malware according to their families.
3.2.5

𝐾-means Clustering with HMM

One proposed approach of malware classification is using clustering algorithms,
which is the basis of research in [4]. The authors have coupled 𝑘-means clustering with
HMM. First, the malware dataset was divided into 5 parts, out of which 4 parts were
used to train HMMs, and then the fifth part scored against these models. The score
is calculated as the log likelihood per opcode (LLPO) in a malware. They repeated
the entire process for 7 different malware compilers so that each malware sample had
seven scores, forming a tuple. These tuples were then used as the dataset for 𝑘-means
clustering with experiments ranging from 𝑘 = 2 to 𝑘 = 15.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
4.1

Dataset
The list of malware families used in the experiments can be found in Table 2.

Opcodes were previously extracted from the malware families and used as input for
the experiments in this project. There are total 5,997 such files which are unequally
distributed amongst the malware families.
Table 2: Malware Distribution in the dataset
Family
adload
bho
bifrose
buzus
ceeinject
delfinject
dorkbot
hotbar
hupigon
ircbot
obfuscator
rbot
vbinject
vobfus
winwebsec
zbot
zegost
Total

4.2

Samples
56
135
305
6
665
278
145
8
169
34
272
34
1342
655
1160
322
411
5997

Setup
In this project, we had opcodes data from previously disassembled malware files.

All other experiments are performed on a single host machine. Following are the
specifications of the host machine:
• Model: Lenovo Yoga 730
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• Processor: Intel Core i7-8550U CPU @ 1.8 Ghz, 2.0 Ghz
• RAM: 16.0 GB
• Operating System: Windows 10 Home 64-bit
4.3

Training HMMs
As the whole project is based on finding distance between the HMMs, the training

phase involves building HMMs on separate files in the dataset. For the experiments,
we used all of the files mentioned above for training HMMs. The HMMs were trained
on the opcode sequences in each of these files. The opcodes are treated as observation
symbols for the HMM. We set the length of the observation sequence 𝑇 = 10, 000
throughout the experiments. Each HMM is trained for up to 50 iterations, and
the model is generated. We repeat this process for a varying number of states 𝑁 ,
from 2 to 4. All the models, denoted as 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) [15], are stored as individual
comma-separated values (CSV) files for future use.
4.4

Clustering Algorithms
Instead of training HMMs on some of the dataset and scoring test data on these

HMMs, we directly compare the HMMs and use the comparison for clustering them
into respective families.
4.4.1

The Naïve 𝐾-means Method

We create a single CSV file with each malware opcode file denoted as a row,
followed by the 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrices. To achieve this, we convert the 𝑛 × 𝑛 𝐴 matrix to
a 1 × 𝑛2 vector and 𝑛 × 𝑚 𝐵 matrix to a 1 × 𝑛𝑚 vector and then store them to the
CSV. Then we use these 𝑛2 + 𝑛𝑚 columns as the features in the 𝑘-means clustering
algorithm. Since 𝑘-means depends on Euclidean distances between data points, we
intrinsically compute distances between the models. Here we do not account for when
the states would have flipped in the HMMs.
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The following example can demonstrate this. Consider the HMMs for two malware
files given by 𝜆1 = (𝐴1 , 𝐵1 , 𝜋1 ) and 𝜆2 = (𝐴2 , 𝐵2 , 𝜋2 ). Let 𝑁 = 2 and 𝑀 = 30. Thus
we can give the matrices as follows:
[︃

𝑎111 𝑎112
𝐴1 =
𝑎121 𝑎122
and

[︃

𝑎211 𝑎212
𝐴2 =
𝑎221 𝑎222

Similarly,

]︃

(1)
]︃

(2)

[︃

𝑏111 𝑏112 · · · 𝑏1130
𝐵1 =
𝑏121 𝑏122 · · · 𝑏1230

and

[︃

𝑏211 𝑏212 · · · 𝑏2130
𝐵2 =
𝑏221 𝑏222 · · · 𝑏2230

]︃

(3)
]︃

(4)

Table 3: Malware Samples in CSV for Naïve 𝐾-means Method
malware family
file1
adload
file2
adload

𝑎11
𝑎111
𝑎211

···
···
···

𝑎22
𝑎122
𝑎222

𝑏11
𝑏111
𝑏211

···
···
···

𝑏130
𝑏1130
𝑏2130

𝑏21
𝑏121
𝑏221

···
···
···

𝑏230
𝑏1230
𝑏2230

Then the CSV file is given as the Table 3. The column 𝑎11 corresponds to the
element in first row and first column of any matrix 𝐴. Similarly, 𝑎22 denotes element
in second row and second column of the matrix 𝐴. Consequently, 𝑏11 and 𝑏130 are
elements of any matrix 𝐵 in first row, and first and thirteeth column respectively;
𝑏21 and 𝑏230 are elements in that 𝐵 matrix in the second row, and first and thirteeth
column respectively. We did this for all HMMs that were obtained from the malware
opcodes. All the columns of 𝐵 matrix in this CSV are given as feature vector input
for the naïve 𝑘-means clustering algorithm with Euclidean distance metric as given in
Chapter 2. The process was repeated for values of 𝑁 from 2 to 4, and for all values of
𝑘 from 2 to 15. We began by finding the optimal 𝑘 using the elbow method discussed
in Chapter 2 and did not expect to get a sharp elbow as our 𝑘-means is naïve. Figure
3 shows the graph obtained for our elbow method.
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Figure 3: Elbow graph for the Naïve 𝑘-means
4.4.2

The 𝐾-medoids Method with Matrix Euclidean Distance

In another experiment, we compare the HMMs directly without converting the
𝐵 matrices to CSV features, again using Euclidean distance as given in Chapter 2.
However, we have used 𝑘-medoids clustering algorithm, which is a slight variation of
the 𝑘-means algorithm, as discussed in Chapter 2. This method takes into account
the flipping of states when computing HMMs.
Consider the two malware samples, 𝜆1 = (𝐴1 , 𝐵1 , 𝜋1 ) and 𝜆2 = (𝐴2 , 𝐵2 , 𝜋2 ), from
above. Again, 𝑁 = 2 and 𝑀 = 30, and we do not consider this method for values of
𝑁 other than 2. This time, consider the 𝐵 matrix row-wise. We can then give the
vector
𝑏1 = (𝑏11, 𝑏12)
where 𝑏11 is first row of 𝐵1 and 𝑏12 is the second row and 𝑏1 is a vector of length 2𝑀 .
Similarly,
𝑏2 = (𝑏21, 𝑏22)
is a vector where 𝑏21 is first row of 𝐵2 and 𝑏22 is the second row. We then computed
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distance between these 2 HMMs as 𝑑(𝑏1, 𝑏2). Another vector
𝑏3 = (𝑏22, 𝑏21)
accounts for the flipped states of HMM. We give the distance between them as
𝑑(𝑏1, 𝑏3). The minimum of these distances is considered as the distance between the
two models.
The next step is to compute a distance correlation matrix to use in 𝑘-medoids
clustering algorithm. For this example, consider two more malware samples in the
system, with HMMs as 𝜆3 = (𝐴3 , 𝐵3 , 𝜋3 ) and 𝜆4 = (𝐴4 , 𝐵4 , 𝜋4 ). The 𝐵 matrices can
be given as follows:

[︃

𝑏311 𝑏312 · · · 𝑏3130
𝐵3 =
𝑏321 𝑏322 · · · 𝑏3230

and

[︃

𝑏411 𝑏412 · · · 𝑏4130
𝐵4 =
𝑏421 𝑏422 · · · 𝑏4230

]︃

(5)
]︃

(6)

Table 4: Distance Correlation Matrix computed for 𝐾-medoids Method
B
𝐵1
𝐵2
𝐵3
𝐵4

𝐵1
0
𝑑(𝐵2 , 𝐵1 )
𝑑(𝐵3 , 𝐵1 )
𝑑(𝐵4 , 𝐵1 )

𝐵2
𝑑(𝐵1 , 𝐵2 )
0
𝑑(𝐵3 , 𝐵2 )
𝑑(𝐵4 , 𝐵2 )

𝐵3
𝑑(𝐵1 , 𝐵3 )
𝑑(𝐵2 , 𝐵3 )
0
𝑑(𝐵4 , 𝐵3 )

𝐵4
𝑑(𝐵1 , 𝐵4 )
𝑑(𝐵2 , 𝐵4 )
𝑑(𝐵3 , 𝐵4 )
0

Then the distance correlation matrix can be given as Table 4. Each distance is
given by following the method above, considering flipping of the states of HMM. This
distance correlation matrix can be given as input data to the 𝑘-medoids clustering
algorithm, which is discussed in Chapter 2. The experiment was repeated for all
values of 𝑘 from 2 to 15. 𝐾 different medoids are chosen randomly from the samples
in the dataset for each of these 𝑘 clusters.
4.4.3

Cluster Entropy

To check how good our clusters are, we calculated the entropies of each cluster
in each of the experiments. Entropy is a general measure of the randomness of a
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cluster [16]. Lower entropy within a cluster and higher entropy between clusters are
indicative of good clustering.
Consider 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , . . . , 𝑋𝑛 as data points in a dataset, and let 𝐶1 , 𝐶2 , . . . , 𝐶𝐾 be
the clusters. Let 𝑀𝑗 be the number of elements in cluster 𝐶𝑗 . Then we can define
𝑀𝑖𝑗 as the number of elements of type 𝑖 in cluster 𝐶𝑗 , with 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑙 where 𝑙
is the number of different families or types of data in the dataset. We can give the
probability of data of type 𝑖 in cluster 𝑗 as 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗 /𝑀𝑗 . Hence the entropy of the
cluster 𝐶𝑗 is given as
𝐸𝑗 = −

𝑙
∑︁

𝑝𝑖𝑗 log(𝑝𝑖𝑗 )

𝑖=1

Then the weighted intra-cluster entropy is given as
𝐸=
4.5

𝐾
1 ∑︁
𝑀𝑗 𝐸𝑗
𝑛 𝑖=1

Discussion on Results
We obtained results as graphs for both the experiments mentioned above and

have discussed them in detail in the following sections.
4.5.1

𝐾-means

As we know from Table 2, the families Vbinject, Winwebsec [10], Vobfus, Ceeinject
and Zegost are most dominant in the clustering. This is best visible in Figure 4, which
depicts clustering with 𝑘 = 8 for 4 hidden states of HMM.
Clearly, cluster 3 contains all the samples from the Vobfus family. Winwebsec
family is dominant in cluster 0, but also constitutes clusters 2 and 7. Even though
Vbinject family has most samples, they fail to be categorized in a single cluster. Most
of Ceeinject family is found in cluster 2, with traces in clusters 5 and 7. Similarly,
Zegost family is distributed between clusters 0, 2, 5 and 7.
The other families in the dataset are Zbot, Adload, Bho, Bifrose, Buzus, Delfinject,
Dorkbot, Hotbar, Hupigon, Ircbot, Obfuscator and Rbot. Their contribution to the
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Figure 4: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 4 HMM hidden states with 𝑘-means

Figure 5: Stacked column chart for 17 families and 4 HMM hidden states with 𝑘-means
dataset is insignificant and is indicated accordingly in Figure 4.
From Figure 4, we also obtained the graph in Figure 5. Clearly, Winwebsec
family has most malware samples from Cluster 0 and Vobfus family has malware
samples from Cluster 3. Ceeinject family derives most malware samples from Cluster
2. Vbinject, despite being the dominant family, has malware samples divided roughly
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equally divided in all clusters.
Table 5: Clustering Entropy for 𝑘-means Method with all 𝑘’s and 𝑁 = 2
Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15

0
2.292
2.255
0.846
0.810
2.136
1.564
1.813
1.913
1.166
1.166
2.267
2.243
1.601
1.767

1
2
3
4
1.665
1.532 0.947
1.525 1.909 2.212
2.196 2.113 1.159 1.905
1.544 1.939 1.139 2.189
1.545 1.155 2.210 1.809
2.197 0.664 1.657 1.612
2.204 1.614 1.913 0.641
1.953 1.686 1.516 0.639
2.000 1.584 2.143 1.343
1.309 2.294 1.497 1.386
2.082 1.681 1.343 1.969
1.471 2.291 1.481 1.125
2.218 0.362 2.138 2.338

5
0.683
0.646
1.147
1.152
1.328
1.254
1.671
1.530
2.293
1.432

6
7
8
1.805
2.080 1.440
1.581 1.864 1.390
2.142 2.291 1.327
1.685 1.511 1.705
1.101 1.717 1.509
1.529 1.082 0.376
0.393 0.302 1.710
2.183 1.863 1.552

9
1.716
0.352
2.072
1.084
1.452
1.674

10
11
12
13
14
2.279
1.964 0.606
1.425 2.221 1.692
1.167 1.975 1.701 0.893
1.050 1.567 0.910 1.344 0.433

E
1.841
1.558
1.760
1.724
1.711
1.626
1.555
1.524
1.667
1.322
1.585
1.731
1.450
1.514

Table 6: Clustering Entropy for 𝑘-means Method with all 𝑘’s and 𝑁 = 3
Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15

0
1.609
0.818
2.233
1.721
0.682
0.647
2.021
0.978
2.348
1.825
2.007
1.383
0.810
1.982

1
2.306
1.430
0.737
1.941
2.263
1.880
2.236
2.005
2.350
2.145
2.333
2.286
2.322
1.235

2
2.288
1.980
1.128
1.355
2.426
1.233
1.800
0.846
2.324
1.240
1.287
1.559
0.941

3
4
1.500
0.677 2.288
1.562 1.237
1.279 1.262
1.775 0.850
0.605 2.147
1.918 1.242
0.744 1.168
0.763 2.305
1.631 1.027
1.024 1.195
2.285 2.332

5
1.895
2.216
1.614
1.318
0.757
1.292
1.363
2.007
1.770
1.292

6
1.287
1.357
2.323
1.163
1.027
1.095
0.966
2.350
1.029

7
0.876
2.382
0.993
1.895
2.315
2.000
1.274
1.135

8
1.389
1.690
2.356
2.010
1.110
1.912
1.399

9
10
11
12
13
14
2.312
0.762 1.669
0.992 1.143 1.057
2.328 0.751 0.806 2.330
1.133 2.122 1.011 0.946 2.249
1.232 2.313 1.998 0.319 2.118 1.137

E
2.110
1.482
1.782
1.376
1.273
1.384
1.531
1.748
1.717
1.422
1.591
1.609
1.397
1.414

Table 7: Clustering Entropy for 𝑘-means Method with all 𝑘’s and 𝑁 = 4
Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15

0
2.297
0.786
1.926
1.256
1.269
2.182
1.501
2.232
0.627
1.147
2.318
0.864
1.205
2.299

1
2
3
4
1.607
2.281 1.363
1.223 0.682 2.297
1.920 1.214 2.299 0.662
2.130 2.273 1.272 0.632
1.262 2.093 0.622 1.220
1.286 2.058 0.633 1.212
0.702 2.276 1.318 1.768
2.333 1.158 1.490 2.344
2.306 2.143 0.735 1.719
1.686 1.171 2.267 1.229
1.098 2.014 1.915 0.732
2.294 0.431 1.442 2.309
2.264 1.848 1.155 2.269

5
1.808
1.799
2.302
1.211
2.302
0.882
2.263
2.304
1.995
0.646

6
2.255
1.112
2.049
2.050
2.088
0.833
1.143
1.127
0.826

7
2.321
1.175
1.140
1.176
1.232
2.286
1.614
1.254

8
0.967
1.215
1.262
2.062
1.218
2.272
1.066

9
1.947
1.245
1.086
1.419
1.235
2.041

10
11
2.260
2.051 0.691
1.174 2.327
1.085 0.937
1.651 2.012

12
13
14
2.339
1.796 1.911
1.222 1.074 1.013

E
1.801
1.792
1.201
1.308
1.388
1.526
1.779
1.495
1.579
1.447
1.573
1.579
1.604
1.507

We also computed the entropies for all the clusters, for all values of 𝑘 from 2 to
15, and all values of 𝑁 from 2 to 4. Table 5 contains the entropies for 𝑁 = 2 while
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Table 6 for 𝑁 = 3. In Table 7, which shows the entropies for 𝑁 = 4, Cluster 3 has an
entropy of 0.633 for 𝑘 = 8, and from Figure 4 we know Cluster 3 shows the most clear
cluster of samples from Vobfus family. Whereas, Cluster 7 has the highest entropy,
meaning it is the most impure cluster. This is evident in Figure 4. All the entropies
in Tables 5, 6 and 7 can be verified as corresponding to the graphs in Appendix A.
The best result for each experiment from 𝑘 = 2 to 𝑘 = 15 is written in bold, while the
best result for each cluster is placed in a box.
𝐾-means clustering algorithm has a major drawback of choosing the number of
clusters 𝑘 before using the algorithm. We have performed experiments for 𝑘 = 2 to
𝑘 = 15 for HMM hidden states 𝑁 from 2 to 4 and discussed the best case at 𝑘 = 8.
All other results can be found in Appendix A and Appendix C.
4.5.2

𝐾-medoids

As we also experimented with 𝑘-medoids algorithm, we also discuss the results
for it here. Figure 6 depicts clustering for 𝑘 = 8 and 2 hidden states of HMM.

Figure 6: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 2 HMM hidden states with 𝑘medoids
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Figure 7: Stacked column chart for 17 families and 2 HMM hidden states with 𝑘medoids
The results are much more divided in this experiment. No single cluster contains
all the files from one family. Vobfus family is divided into Cluster 2 and 4. Vbinject
family is also divided into all clusters except 2 and 4. Winwebsec family is present in
all clusters, but is dominant in Cluster 7. Ceeinject family is dominant in Cluster 5
but is also spread into other clusters.
We can confirm these deductions by obtaining the graph in Figure 7. As pointed
out earlier, Winwebsec family is derived from Cluster 7, while Vofbus family has most
samples from Cluster 2.
We again computed the entropies for all the clusters, for all values of 𝑘 from 2
to 15. These are given in Table 8 below. Cluster 2 has an entropy of 0.664 and in
Figure 6 cluster 2 shows the most clear cluster of samples from Vobfus family. Cluster
1 has the highest entropy indicating the most impure cluster. We can verify all the
entropies in Table 8 as corresponding to the graphs in Appendix B. The best result
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Table 8: Clustering Entropy for 𝑘-medoids Method with all 𝑘’s and 𝑁 = 2
Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15

0
1.860
1.709
2.195
1.898
2.290
1.996
2.210
1.889
2.195
2.347
1.879
2.090
2.422
2.322

1
2
3
4
2.315
2.223 1.438
0.749 2.217 1.367
1.611 2.203 1.061 0.753
0.516 1.543 1.971 1.331
1.862 1.202 1.540 2.239
2.253 0.441 1.431 1.162
1.186 1.431 1.541 2.257
1.832 0.888 0.282 1.508
1.518 0.282 1.346 1.960
1.060 1.954 1.494 1.764
2.343 1.426 1.109 1.928
1.064 1.636 0.109 1.813
1.801 1.413 1.585 0.847

5
6
7
8
1.503
1.639 0.502
2.002 1.055 1.846
1.039 1.055 1.852 1.995
1.057 1.431 1.929 1.104
1.896 2.205 0.888 1.036
2.265 1.489 1.508 0.474
0.986 0.888 1.607 0.373
0.685 0.517 0.282 1.897
1.876 1.060 1.031 1.752

9
2.239
1.925
0.888
1.528
1.550
0.164

10
11
12
13
1.085
1.104 1.813
1.892 1.887 0.259
1.912 1.494 1.104 1.483
0.995 0.109 1.783 0.663

14
2.193

E
2.187
1.959
1.889
1.915
1.800
1.852
1.760
1.794
1.732
1.732
1.696
1.651
1.629
1.663

for each experiment from 𝑘 = 2 to 𝑘 = 15 is written in bold, while the best result for
each cluster is placed in a box.
𝐾-medoids faces the issue of choosing number of clusters 𝑘, similar to 𝑘-means.
We have performed experiments for 𝑘 = 2 to 𝑘 = 15 for HMM hidden states 𝑁 = 2
and discussed the best case at 𝑘 = 8. All other results can be found in Appendix B.

Figure 8: Comparison of Weighted Entropies as a function of 𝑘
We also compared the results of all our experiments by comparing the weighted
intra-cluster entropies for all values of 𝑘 from 2 to 15, and displayed the result as a
graph given the Figure 8. It shows different trends for each experiment. All the naïve
𝑘-means experiments have fluctuating weighted entropies as the number of clusters
change. 𝐾-means with 𝑁 = 2 has a dip in the weighted entropy for 𝑘 = 11, while for
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𝑁 = 3 the dip is observed at 𝑘 = 6. For 𝑁 = 4, the weighted entropy is lowest at
𝑘 = 4. However, we do not find spikes in the 𝑘-medoids method, although there is a
downward trend in the entropy with increasing number of clusters.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we proposed and evaluated clustering algorithms for classifying
about 5997 malware opcode samples. Instead of scoring the samples using hidden
Markov models, we only computed the models on every malware sample. We then
used the 𝐵 matrices of each model as the difference between models and used it
to calculate distances. We used these 𝐵 matrices in two experiments. The first
experiment converted the 𝐵 matrices to a dataframe and directly used with a 𝑘means clustering algorithm. The second experiment used custom distance calculation
between 𝐵 matrices of models and used it with a 𝑘-medoids clustering algorithm. We
performed experiments for varying numbers of clusters from 𝑘 = 2 to 𝑘 = 15. We
then plotted stacked column charts for all the cases. The case 𝑘 = 8 looks to be the
best in both these experiments. The distinction between families was clearly visible in
the clusters in this case. The results showed that HMMs are effective in classifying
malware automatically.
We calculated the distance for the clustering algorithms using the Euclidean
distance formula in this project. Other methods like Minkowski distance or cosine
distance can be explored in future work. Another idea for future work would be to
compute the distance between HMMs using the technique given in [14].
We used two types of centroid selection for clustering. We have computed the
cluster centroids by calculating the mean of the respective clusters for experiments
with the 𝑘-means method. For the 𝑘-medoids method, the centroids were randomly
selected from within the data. Spherical 𝑘-means clustering, expectation-maximization
(EM) clustering, and Density-based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise
(DBSCAN) can also be explored as clustering options in the future.
Some of the malware samples are very different than others. We can filter these
28

out from the dataset for much accurate clustering in the future. Also, in the future,
we can train the HMMs only for the dominant malware families in the dataset to see
how the clusters are affected.
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APPENDIX A
Graphs for Naïve 𝐾-means Method

Figure A.9: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.10: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.11: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.12: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.13: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.14: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

35

Figure A.15: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.16: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.17: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.18: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.19: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.20: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.21: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.22: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.23: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.24: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.25: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.26: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.27: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.28: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.29: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.30: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.31: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.32: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.33: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.34: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.35: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.36: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.37: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.38: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.39: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.40: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.41: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.42: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.43: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.44: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.45: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.46: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.47: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.48: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure A.49: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 3 hidden states in HMM
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Figure A.50: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 4 hidden states in HMM
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APPENDIX B
Graphs for 𝐾-medoids Method with Matrix Euclidean Distance

Figure B.51: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.52: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure B.53: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.54: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure B.55: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.56: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure B.57: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.58: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure B.59: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.60: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.61: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure B.62: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.63: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure B.64: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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APPENDIX C
Naïve 𝐾-means Method for HMMs with M = 50
The naïve 𝑘-means clustering experiments were repeated for newly trained HMMs
with 2 hidden states i.e. 𝑁 = 2 and the number of observation symbols 𝑀 was
changed to 50 to include top 50 opcodes over the entire dataset. 92.09 percent of
opcodes are represented in these HMMs. The resulting graphs and entropies of the
clustering experiments are given below.

Figure C.65: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
These experiments have been compared with kernel 𝑘-means in Appendix D.
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Figure C.66: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.67: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.68: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.69: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.70: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.71: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.72: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.73: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.74: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.75: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.76: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.77: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.78: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.79: Stacked column chart for 16 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.80: Stacked column chart for 17 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.81: Stacked column chart for 18 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.82: Stacked column chart for 19 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.83: Stacked column chart for 20 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.84: Stacked column chart for 21 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.85: Stacked column chart for 22 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.86: Stacked column chart for 23 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure C.87: Stacked column chart for 24 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure C.88: Stacked column chart for 25 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15
𝑘 = 16
𝑘 = 17
𝑘 = 18
𝑘 = 19
𝑘 = 20
𝑘 = 21
𝑘 = 22
𝑘 = 23
𝑘 = 24
𝑘 = 25

0
1
2
2.247 1.607
1.717 2.226 1.596
1.553 1.895 1.695
1.897 2.309 1.487
1.723 2.244 1.699
1.909 1.919 2.254
1.927 1.624 1.619
2.085 1.619 2.297
1.941 1.909 2.097
2.039 1.841 1.641
0.485
2.19
1.844
0.363 1.957 1.506
1.253 1.898 2.035
1.409 1.925 1.922
1.445 2.108 1.708
1.324 1.939 1.672
1.900 1.913 1.897
0.392 1.924 2.170
0.502 1.930 1.926
1.725 1.724 0.482
2.185 1.372 1.912
1.736 1.927 1.285
1.871 1.273 1.502
1.404 1.960 1.963

3
4
5
2.312
1.691 1.765
1.971 2.209 1.488
1.380 1.631 2.216
2.122 1.902 2.113
0.357 1.387 2.127
1.582 1.575 2.174
1.921 1.377 1.888
2.159
1.83
1.391
2.137 2.108 1.955
1.800 1.943 2.264
1.662 0.363 2.134
1.674 1.938 1.912
2.001 2.207 2.039
2.147 2.191 1.936
1.300 1.597 1.366
1.360 1.672 2.187
1.295 1.909 2.126
1.698 1.703 1.330
2.230 2.211 1.355
1.701 1.686 1.710
1.676 2.072 2.124

6
7
8
9
1.620
1.375 2.304
1.876 1.937 1.707
1.394 2.176 1.478 1.951
1.934 2.108 2.304 0.510
1.944 1.999 1.455 1.668
2.126 0.502 1.660 1.478
1.654 0.502 1.937 0.535
2.186 1.251 1.293 0.485
2.137 1.978 2.152 0.342
1.846 1.478 1.675 1.937
1.710 1.316 1.669 2.175
2.198 1.682 0.498 1.702
1.755 2.012 1.578 1.838
1.681 1.956 2.175 1.655
1.702 1.919 0.487 2.103
0.643 2.017 1.249 1.745
1.961 2.188 1.682 1.529
0.360 1.913 0.482 1.714

10
11
12
13
14
1.593
2.189 1.445
2.010 1.767 1.208
1.593 1.285 2.189 1.478
2.230 1.927 1.903 1.713 1.715
1.838 1.314 0.485 0.483 1.445
1.244 1.752 0.363 0.477 2.118
1.811 1.925 1.247 1.541 1.669
1.693 2.198 1.241 1.948 2.154
0.378 1.713 1.309 2.200 1.478
1.220 1.634 1.541 1.671 0.363
2.224 1.746 1.507 1.915 1.529
1.919 0.383 2.258 1.902 1.372
2.189 1.904 1.952 0.482 1.400
1.814 1.855 1.306 2.250 1.233

15
16
17
18
1.251
1.541 1.908
0.502 0.302 1.409
1.478 1.541 1.921 1.885
1.237 1.363 1.783 2.149
1.529 1.941 1.829 1.330
0.363 0.640 1.541 1.275
1.716 1.330 1.541 1.703
2.124 0.303 1.541 1.073
2.287 1.702 1.664 1.445

19
1.927
1.386
1.265
1.529
0.992
0.719

20
21
22
23
2.320
1.950 2.043
0.487 1.603 1.879
2.080 0.483 1.220 1.765
0.935 1.465 2.043 1.253

24
1.541

E
2.029
2.014
1.923
1.920
1.929
1.896
1.889
1.883
1.885
1.879
1.861
1.846
1.834
1.782
1.807
1.810
1.793
1.796
1.770
1.762
1.763
1.755
1.739
1.737

Table C.9: Clustering Entropy for Euclidean Distance 𝑘-means Method for all 𝑘’s
with 𝑁 = 2 and 𝑀 = 50
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APPENDIX D
Kernel 𝐾-means Method for HMMs with M = 50
The kernel 𝑘-means clustering experiments were repeated for newly trained
HMMs with 2 hidden states i.e. 𝑁 = 2 and the number of observation symbols
𝑀 was changed to 50 to include top 50 opcodes over the entire dataset. Kernel
𝑘-means method involved bootstrapping the matrix Euclidean distance function with
the original 𝑘-means clustering algorithm. The resulting graphs and entropies of the
clustering experiments are given below.
We also compared the results of all our experiments with 50-opcode HMMs,
from both Appendix C and Appendix D by comparing the weighted intra-cluster
entropies for all values of 𝑘 from 2 to 25, and displayed the result as a graph given
the Figure D.113. It shows decreasing trends for both the experiments, with increase
in the number of clusters 𝑘.

Figure D.89: Stacked column chart for 2 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.90: Stacked column chart for 3 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.91: Stacked column chart for 4 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.92: Stacked column chart for 5 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.93: Stacked column chart for 6 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.94: Stacked column chart for 7 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.95: Stacked column chart for 8 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.96: Stacked column chart for 9 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.97: Stacked column chart for 10 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.98: Stacked column chart for 11 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.99: Stacked column chart for 12 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

71

Figure D.100: Stacked column chart for 13 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.101: Stacked column chart for 14 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.102: Stacked column chart for 15 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.103: Stacked column chart for 16 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.104: Stacked column chart for 17 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.105: Stacked column chart for 18 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.106: Stacked column chart for 19 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.107: Stacked column chart for 20 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.108: Stacked column chart for 21 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.109: Stacked column chart for 22 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.110: Stacked column chart for 23 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM
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Figure D.111: Stacked column chart for 24 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.112: Stacked column chart for 25 clusters and 2 hidden states in HMM

Figure D.113: Comparison of Weighted Entropies as a function of 𝑘
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Cluster
𝑘=2
𝑘=3
𝑘=4
𝑘=5
𝑘=6
𝑘=7
𝑘=8
𝑘=9
𝑘 = 10
𝑘 = 11
𝑘 = 12
𝑘 = 13
𝑘 = 14
𝑘 = 15
𝑘 = 16
𝑘 = 17
𝑘 = 18
𝑘 = 19
𝑘 = 20
𝑘 = 21
𝑘 = 22
𝑘 = 23
𝑘 = 24
𝑘 = 25

0
1
2
1.628 2.285
1.684 2.250 1.816
1.957 2.310 1.544
2.286 1.517 1.980
1.743 2.156 1.456
1.772 2.420 1.687
2.405 1.739 2.118
2.401 2.320 1.158
2.404 1.594 1.930
1.811 1.872 1.982
2.386 1.921 1.990
1.692 2.378 1.290
2.164 2.319 1.966
1.085 1.065 0.449
2.042 0.549 2.027
1.600 1.662 2.283
2.292 1.191 1.976
1.729 1.862 1.345
2.055 0.961 1.305
1.925 1.205 0.442
1.599 0.528 1.921
1.555 1.613 2.238
2.188 1.913 1.765
1.168 0.493 2.011

3
4
5
2.183
1.732 1.792
1.773 1.976 2.292
1.954 1.359 2.105
1.359 1.690 2.453
1.359 1.749 2.127
2.419 1.742 2.001
2.342 1.519 1.764
1.985 2.024 1.404
1.833 1.276 2.028
1.680 0.451 1.243
2.115 1.709 1.885
0.515 2.004 2.265
0.445 1.302 2.098
0.459 2.301 2.005
1.907 0.528 1.205
1.840 2.096 1.961
2.027 1.682 2.101
0.979 1.973 1.205
1.983 1.364 1.623
1.623 1.983 2.025
1.408 2.212 1.257

6
7
2.098
1.929 1.513
2.108 1.690
1.432 2.284
2.102 1.281
1.562 1.855
0.515 2.465
1.143 1.817
2.018 1.866
1.854 1.004
1.832 2.237
1.817 1.529
1.913 1.863
1.515 1.454
1.016 1.452
1.681 1.906
1.863 0.990
1.408 1.783
1.764 1.913

8
1.929
1.255
2.033
1.583
1.976
1.751
1.708
2.017
1.443
1.305
2.245
0.515
1.921
1.682
0.500
1.257
1.207

9
1.173
2.174
2.371
1.414
2.111
1.316
1.891
1.976
1.459
2.027
1.191
0.528
1.012
1.873
2.225
1.012

10
11
1.580
1.400 0.449
1.864 1.973
1.265 0.528
2.096 1.188
1.647 1.260
0.515 1.364
1.814 2.098
2.100 1.540
1.978 1.364
1.560 1.715
2.250 1.400
1.199 1.255
0.909 1.863
2.094 1.831

12
13
14
15
16
17
0.449
2.236 1.846
2.387 2.327 1.304
1.569 1.226 2.287 2.118
1.990 1.855 1.844 1.003 1.972
1.364 1.675 1.855 1.003 0.515 1.867
1.681 0.429 2.261 1.244 1.978 2.234
2.007 1.675 2.145 0.455 2.172 2.227
1.973 1.855 2.195 1.244 1.681 1.364
1.715 1.244 2.027 0.449 1.855 2.101
0.494 1.403 1.303 1.992 2.236 2.215
1.297 0.500 2.205 1.207 1.400 1.387
1.680 0.469 2.312 1.387 1.623 1.267

18
1.436
2.285
2.253
2.195
1.850
0.493
2.036

19
1.863
2.250
1.560
2.111
2.072
2.130

20
21
22
23
0.483
2.253 0.483
1.921 0.483 1.676
1.732 0.449 1.523 1.012
1.917 1.240 1.523 1.825

24
0.500

E
2.082
2.070
1.997
1.978
1.959
1.941
1.878
1.843
1.855
1.892
1.838
1.838
1.800
1.814
1.806
1.786
1.781
1.783
1.768
1.743
1.742
1.720
1.686
1.703

Table D.10: Clustering Entropy for Euclidean Distance 𝑘-means Method for all 𝑘’s
with 𝑁 = 2 and 𝑀 = 50
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